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In the past years we have seen a somewhat paradoxical evolution in EU trade 
politics. While the Lisbon Treaty was meant to facilitate the adoption of trade 
agreements by bolstering the exclusive supranational competence of the 
European Union, (sub-)national Parliaments have now become more involved 
in trade policy than ever before. We investigate this shift in involvement 
across the Belgian parliaments. In the past fifteen years, both the Federal, 
Flemish and Walloon parliament paid little attention to EU trade policy. This 
has changed since 2014, especially in Wallonia but also in the other 
assemblies. Combining a variety of sources, we conclude that several 
interacting factors have fuelled this increase in Parliamentary involvement. 
First, TTIP and CETA contain ‘deep trade’ provisions that have alerted MPs. 
Second, TTIP has generated an unseen amount of mobilisation and 
contestation, and this has led politicians (especially on the left and in the 
opposition) to join the fray as well. Finally, the asymmetry between the 
Walloon and federal governing coalitions have favoured a more activist 
opposition by Wallonia, while Flanders’ centre-right coalition has remained 
supportive. 
  
Introduction - EU trade policy-making after Lisbon  
 
Although trade policy has been a supranational competence from the outset of European 
integration, there have always been political and judicial struggles over the exact scope 
of this competence and the division of labour among EU and national institutions 
(Young, 2000; Billiet, 2005). At its core, much of this debate has revolved around the 
trade-off between efficiency (by increasing supranational authority and Commission 
autonomy) and legitimacy: how can the EU negotiate and conclude ambitious 
agreements while at the same time safeguarding (sub)national interests and 
involvement (Meunier 2005)? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty attempted to resolve this trade-off by transcending it (cfr. Woolcock 
2010; Kleimann 2011; Devuyst 2013). On the one hand, the ‘efficiency’ dimensions was 
strengthened by expanding the scope of supranational competences (which now also 
cover services, intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment), thereby 
limiting the need for national (often: parliamentary) ratification.  This change was 
necessary, it was argued, to make the EU a more reliable and efficient negotiating 
partner. On the other hand, the ‘legitimacy’ of the EU’s trade policies was to be bolstered 
by expanding the role of the European Parliament (EP)1.  
To some extent these reforms meant that democratic control over trade was being 
transferred from national assemblies to the European Parliament (Krajewski 2013)2. 
This move was not universally welcomed. For instance, some scholars pointed out that 
giving the European Parliament more power in trade may be welcomed from a European 
legitimacy/effectiveness point of view, but that (sub)national parliaments remain the 
most appropriate forum to discuss and decide on social objectives and (re)distributive 
consequences of trade agreements. Since the EU’s new competences went well beyond 
classic ‘at-the-border’ instruments such as tariffs, expanding into the ‘deep trade’ zone of 
regulatory and normative issues (see Young, 2006), ‘subsidiarity’ did not clearly favour 
further Europeanization (Bossuyt, 2012; De Ville, 2012).  Seen from this angle, the 
Lisbon Treaty changes did not overcome the fundamental trade governance question: 
how can we reconcile the benefits of (institutionalized) open trade, with the right of 
(sub)national authorities to pursue legitimate domestic policy goals? (De Ville, 2012; see 
also Rodrik, 2007; Howse & Nicolaïdis, 2003) 
 
It is perhaps somewhat of a paradox, then, that the post-Lisbon decade has witnessed 
some of the most vocal and demanding interventions by national parliaments in EU 
trade politics to date. Whereas parliaments used to have formal power over the 
ratification phase, their interest and weight in trade decision making was in practice 
extremely limited. Yet now that their formal role has diminished, assemblies in 
Germany, Austria, Belgium and other countries have debated this policy to an extent 
seldom seen in the preceding decades. If anything, the post-Lisbon trade agenda seems 
                                                        
1
 The EP was given co-decision powers in trade policy legislation. With respect to free trade agreements, the 
Treaty stipulated that the European Parliament has to be kept continuously informed by the European 
Commission about the state and progress of trade negotiations (in contrast to the Council, it does not have to 
give the Commission the authority to open negotiations) and that its consent (by a simple majority of its 
members) is required for an agreement to enter into force. 
2
 A third reform of the Lisbon Treaty, bringing trade policy under the foreign policy umbrella of the treaty 
(without, however, making the European External Action Service responsible for the policy domain), is of less 
importance for this paper.  
 
to have (re)invigorated the interest in, and potentially influence over, EU trade deals by 
national Parliaments. 
 
In this paper, we seek to shed some light on this (apparent) paradox by looking at the 
Belgian case. Not only because of this country’s immediate political significance, in light 
of Wallonia’s manoeuvres to block the EU-Canada (CETA) deal in the autumn of 2016, 
but also because the difference between years of parliamentary neglect and the recent 
outburst of attention and contestation seems to be especially pronounced here. Our text 
is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the involvement of the Belgian 
parliaments in trade over the years, based on desk research and about fifteen interviews 
with decision-makers and stakeholders in Belgium. In the following section, we offer a 
number of explanations for the recent politicisation of European trade policy in Belgium. 
We conclude with some reflections about the implications of these developments for the 
future of EU trade policy.  
National Parliamentary involvement in EU trade policy: the case of Belgium 
 
Trade-Policy Making in Belgium 
 
Since the late 1980s, a series of constitutional reforms have completely altered the way 
that foreign- and trade policies are formulated in Belgium. The “Sint-Michiels 
Agreement” of 1993 granted the sub-national governments the ability to sign 
international agreements in matters where they held the exclusive competence. A non-
hierarchical system was set in place, in which the federal level was primarily in charge of 
coordinating the other levels. Belgium could now no longer take any stance unless 
Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders (i.e. the communal/regional governments) were able to 
reach an agreement. Without consensus, Belgium would need to abstain. In 2001 and 
2016, the remaining chunks of exportpolicy were regionalized, along with federal funds 
and personnel.3 These transitions were not always very smooth, and were often 
accompanied by inter-institutional struggles (Coolsaet, 2015).4 
 
This devolution has led to (or has been accompanied by) the construction of regional 
trade administrations and export agencies, as well as the growth of an intensive process 
of coordination between the federal and sub-national levels, organized by the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. This coordinative webbing has also spread to the sub-national levels, 
where various parties and departments now have to come to a regional (or communal) 
position as well. Flanders has dealt with this by creating institutions similar to those at 
the Federal level: with the support of his administration (‘Department International 
Flanders’) the Flemish minister of foreign trade5 organizes (bi-)weekly consultations in 
                                                        
3
 For example, the ‘Belgian Service for International Trade’ was transformed into the ‘interfederal’ ‘Agency for 
Foreign Trade’, and was to operate ‘at the service’ of the regional export-agencies that had been created in the 
1990s. 
4
 Economic diplomacy and export-promotion have been the most important bones of contention, Flanders in 
particular has been suspicious of the federal level clawing back some of its lost prerogatives (Coolsaet, 2015). 
Moreover, there have been persistent concerns that the fragmentation of international trade policy is hampering 
the coherence as well as the pursuit of Belgian and sub-national trade interests. For example, minister of 
development Alexander De Croo recently launched a proposal to reverse some of this devolution in a variety of 
policy areas, including trade and development. 
5
 This has almost always been the Flemish head of government, or ‘minister-president’.  
a ‘Working group on EU Trade’; here, cabinet-members and technical personnel from all 
interested departments discuss policy positions drafted by ‘International Flanders’. 
Wallonia’s internal decision-making is less institutionalized, and relies on informal 
contacts between (the administration of) the Minister of Commerce, the regional and 
communal Heads of Government (in charge of foreign affairs), and the joint international 
affairs’ administration of the Francophone Community and the Walloon Region, 
‘Wallonia-Brussels International’.  
 
Parliamentary Involvement  
 
The Belgian Parliaments are weak and subjugated players in the Belgian system, which 
is dominated by the parties in government. The real decisions are made in the 
administrations and at the inter-ministerial level, coordinating across the Belgian strata. 
There is little reasons to expect trade policy to be any different, especially since the 
‘formal’ role of the Parliaments was always rather limited here (see infra). Apart from 
ratifying treaties, they could at most vote for non-binding resolutions.  
 
Yet their lack of clear avenues for a strong formal role in the Belgian trade policy system 
does not necessarily exclude Parliamentary influence through other means. Non-binding 
resolutions, Parliamentary questions and hearings, as well as reports and interviews in 
public media can all put pressure on government policies. Individual members of 
Parliament can also build up expertise and a network of their own, for example within 
the cabinets or through influential stakeholders, that allows them to exert some control 
over the Belgian position. The Parliament can also serve as a ‘bullhorn’ or intermediary 
for societal (or interest group) demands. 
 
On the basis of interviews with MPs as well as NGOs and trade officials, it seems that the 
Parliament has seldom attempted to play an autonomous role of much importance. As 
we will show, this has become less true in recent years.   
 
Some Data: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Trade Issues 
 
Using the search engines from the Walloon, Flemish and Federal parliaments6, we have 
constructed a database of all trade-related questions (written and oral)7. As can be seen 
from the graphs, in all three the attention for trade issues has generally been low but has 
recently exploded.  
 
                                                        
6
 Long lists of keywords have been used to search for questions or resolutions that deal with trade policy. The 
list is available on demand.  
7
 The number of interventions isn’t strictly comparable, because of differences in the size of the parliaments and 




In the federal parliament, the attention paid to trade issues has generally been low, 
with peaks in interventions in 2005 (related to textiles and the Doha round), after 2009 
(related to a wide variety of issues) and since 2012. The spike since 2014 is 
unprecedented.  This dynamic is not wholly attributable to the increasing zeal of 
particular MP’s (although some of the trends are driven by large batches of questions 
launched by individual representatives). As can be seen in the graph, it is also driven by 




In the Flemish parliament, activity related to trade issues has been slowly increasing 
after 2009. A previous peak of activity had built up around 2005, but activity has 
matched or exceeded the 2005 count since 2010.  Just like at the federal level, this 
activity is partly related to the growth of active MPs. We expect 2016 to be another peak 
year, since our count was finalized in September –before Wallonia’s temporary, yet 
passionately debated, refusal to sign CETA. If we included questions revolving around 
‘Brexit’ it would already be outpacing 2015. However, only a minor part of this attention 
is directed at ‘EU’ trade policy directly. Most of the questions, furthermore, have almost 
always been about economic diplomacy, and the export performance of Flanders and 
Flemish business. We have thrown these into one category of ‘performance/promotion’. 
Excluding this, we can see the same basic trends but the difference compared to 2005 is 





In the Walloon parliament, as in the other ones, there was a steady increase in 
attention after 2009, although this mostly disappears if we remove the export 
promotion/performance dimension. Non ‘performance-related’ (i.e. FTAs…) topics, 
however, have steadily grown in importance since 2012. Again this has been 






Turning our attention to the substance of this activity, some thematic trends emerge. 
First of all: whereas the bulk of activity at the Federal level used to be (before 2006) 
oriented at the WTO, this shifted towards FTAs after the general trough in trade-related 
questions between 2006 and 2009. Secondly: peaks in activity seem to be accompanied 
by an increase in the concern for the ‘ethical’ dimension of trade. Thirdly: there has been 
constant attention for trade performance/promotion (including economic diplomacy), 
although not to the extent seen in the regional parliaments (see below). The interest in 
trade-related development issues (for example the EPA’s) and trade defenses (anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy, etc) has been more ‘incidental’. Again, the graphs above show 
quite clearly how unprecedented the attention for TTIP is, and how CETA has followed 




Decomposing the data at the Flemish level, we can see that the latest increase is due to 
an uptick in the performance-related attention, but also due to an increase in the 
amount of questions about ‘FTAs’. We can also discern the 2005 peak, caused to some 
extent by the ‘textiles’ wars’ after the ‘Multi Fiber Agreement’ was phased out. Trade 
defenses have not attracted much attention in any other year, we counted only two 
further questions8 .The recent attention for FTAs has been driven by TTIP and CETA. In 
line with the chronology of the politicization of these negotiations, TTIP started 
attracting attention before the older CETA deal, which thereafter followed in its 
slipstream.  As can also be seen in the graphs, there has been a low but constant 
attention for what we have categorized as being ‘ethical’  concerns. These have also been 
elevated in recent years. This includes several questions related to the textiles industry, 
some general questions about ‘fair and sustainable trade’, and a handful of other 




In Wallonia, the most dominant subject that has been discussed is the region’s export 
performance, and the various missions, meetings, campaigns etcetera organized to 
                                                        
8
 One related to the light-bulb dispute with China, the other related to China’s bid for ‘Market Economy Status 
(in 2016).  
9
 A possible reason for the small number of questions on these ethical dimensions, is that we coded every 
question according to its main category, while the question itself could have included several sub-questions. For 
example, several inquiries concerned export promotion missions, but also (as a side question) include demands 
for information on human rights in the relevant country. 
promote Walloon industry abroad10. This category also encapsulates the discussions 
over the internal institutions (i.e. AWEX) and the intra-Belgian cooperation dedicated to 
economic diplomacy. Clearly, the interest in this topic exploded after 2009. A series of 
other issues have at times caught the parliament’s eye as well, but to a much more 
limited extent. After 2012 this has started changing, with the increasing scrutiny of TTIP 
and CETA. Here, once more the same picture emerges: growing attention for TTIP, 
followed and eventually surpassed by increasing scrutiny of CETA. Other FTAs have 





Finally, in all parliaments, more (non ‘promotion’ related) activity has (usually) been 
initiated by the opposition parties than the governing parties, although this has leveled 
out in recent years. In Wallonia’s case the reverse has been true since 2015, as the 
governing parties (PS, cdH) have raised more questions than the MR. Of course, 
government/opposition dynamics are complicated in the Belgian setting, because the 
federal and regional coalitions are not necessarily symmetric. The MR, for example, is 
currently part of the federal but not the Walloon government.  
Interviews 
 
Next to composing these general figures on the rough ‘quantitative’ trends in 
parliamentary scrutiny, we have also conducted a series of interviews with Flemish, 
Walloon and Federal MPs to substantiate these findings. We also looked at the substance 
of parliamentary debates, hearings and resolutions, while using GoPress to perform a 
cursory analysis of the press’ coverage of recent events.   
 
First of all, our interviewees confirmed that Parliamentary attention for trade policy has 
generally been very low, at least until TTIP, and that this had seldom been a divisive, 
partisan issue. This is true for all Parliaments, not just the national one. In the Flemish 
parliament, for example, past, discussion had often been limited to the economic 
missions undertaken by Belgium and the regions. With the exception of arms’ trade, 
there was seldom any discussions or larger debate on trade (or foreign) policy, which 
also reflected the lack of real, politically salient cleavages among the parties.  Asked for 
the percentage of their time spent on trade (in 2016, so after TTIP became a relatively 
big issue), several of our respondents estimated this was at most about 5-10%, while it 
was even less in the past. This makes MPs dependent on the expertise (and agenda-
setting) of outside players such as NGOs.  
                                                        
10 To be fair, this finding may be produced by the way Wallonia's search engine works. We've been 
working on going through the committee hearings manually. 
 
Secondly, our interviewees confirmed that Parliamentary ratification has almost always 
been a pro-forma – or ‘rubber-stamping’ – procedure. One interviewee could recall only 
one instance  in which the Parliament defied the government by refusing to ratify a 
signed agreement, the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Yet even here, the Parliament 
eventually yielded to government pressure and ratified the deal. More generally, the 
MPs were aware of the constraints that the Belgium system imposes on parliamentary 
action. They did not believe that the parliamentary debates in themselves had much 
power to shape policy. By the time these dossiers finally end up in the committee, the 
course and the policy positions of the parties have already been set: the government has 
decided on its position, negotiations have nearly been completed, if the issue drew civil 
society’s attention then stakeholders and associated parties have staked out their 
position and have dug in their heels. Given the parliament’s subservience to the 
governing coalition’s policies and dynamics, any subsequent debate (no matter how 
fiery) is mostly for show. Especially for MPs from the governing parties, making use of 
informal channels to influence decision making at an earlier stage is more likely to bear 
fruit.  
 
As is also evident from our interviews, however, parliamentary work on trade has 
picked up tremendously in recent years. Most of this activity has revolved around the 
controversial deals with the US and Canada. In Flanders for example, TTIP has received 
a rare amount of parliamentary attention: not only have the negotiations been discussed 
in multiple debates, they have also been the subject of hearings with academics, 
stakeholders and EU/US diplomats and politicians. Even MPs from the (left-wing) 
opposition were pleased (and a little surprised) with the amount of space allotted to 
these deals. Moreover, the passive consensus has made way for ideologically charged 
divisions. Our respondents from the right echoed the Economist’s observation that old 
left-right cleavages had been cross-cut by an open-closed divide (The Economist,2016). 
Substantively, they argued, the Greens and Socialists were now allied with the extreme-
right. Our respondents of the left, on the other hand, rejoiced that the ‘TINA’ doctrine 
had now been challenged, even though the right-wing majority still tended to 
unreflexively support any proposed trade deal.  
 
The same developments were present, a fortiori, in Wallonia. With the arrival of the 
new parliament (May 29, 2014), there was an important shift in the modus operandi of 
the assembly regarding trade deals. Whereas before the committee on European Affairs 
“had not spent resources on scrutinizing the pre-approval phase of the deals”, it now took 
an interest in the ongoing TTIP-negotiations, therefore “radically changing the 
Parliament’s practices by preoccupying itself, proactively, with a potential future treaty, 
rather than finding, at the time the agreement is enacted, that certain elements could have 
taken another form” (Comité d’avis chargé des questions Européennes, 2015, pp. 1–2). 
The parliament then organized a series of (committee and plenary) debates, hearings 
with policy-makers, stakeholders and experts, and also greatly increased the volume of 
questions directed at the government.  
 
As in Flanders these debates were ideologically charged, but contrary to the centre-right 
majority’s general satisfaction with the deals in the north, in Wallonia this led to a revolt 
against the ‘rubberstamping’ of FTAs. This has so far gone farthest in concern to CETA. 
On 26 May 2015 the centre-left PS proposed a resolution with concerns about CETA, 
which was adopted (with the support of all parties except for the liberal MR) on 7 April 
2016. The draft resolution’s wording was strong, calling CETA a ‘Trojan horse’ and 
opposing the deal as it stood, but became even sharper and more detailed in the final 
version – now openly asking that the government not give the federal level the power to 
sign the deal. On 14 October 2016, the Walloon parliament again confirmed its 
resistance – a message condoned by the Walloon government. This triggered an intra-
Belgian as well as a European crisis, since it meant that Belgium would not be able to 
sign the treaty. After several days of hard re-negotiation both intra-Belgium and with 
European leaders, the parliament did however ultimately condone Wallonia’s and 
therefore Belgium’s signing of the deal on 28 October 2016 (only Ecolo and the PTB 
voted against). Whether the Parliament will eventually also ratify the agreement 
remains unsure, however, and is now (according to the intra-Belgian deal)  contingent 
on a series of demands being met. Although it is unclear to what extent this move is 
indicative of Parliamentary ‘emancipation’ from the regional government (the 
Government was critical of the agreement, and the resolutions were supported by the 
governing parties), this nonetheless represents a break from past passivity.   
  
Finally, the politicization of TTIP has also fostered the Parliaments’ need for expertise 
and networks in these dossiers. The federal Chamber of Representatives as well as all 
regions have organized Parliamentary hearings about CETA and TTIP, and have invited 
Commissioner Malmström to come and explain the deals. The federal Parliament has 
also tried to strengthen its links with the INTA committee, which, as Belgian MP’s 
acknowledge, still houses most trade-related expertise.  
 
Some (but certainly not all) MPs are pessimistic about the durability of this new interest 
in trade policy, an issue we will pick up in the concluding section. Still, the break from 
the past is remarkable and in light of the diminished (formal) power of the national 
parliaments since Lisbon  also somewhat puzzling. 
Explaining the shifts in Parliamentary involvement 
 
Why the lack of attention before the Lisbon Treaty? 
 
A first question we need to answer is why Belgian Parliaments dedicated so little 
attention to EU trade policy before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, i.e. at a time 
when they still had the power to ratify EU trade agreements. 
 
Part of the answer can be found in how Belgian Parliaments are organized and relate to 
the government. Members of Parliament have an overcrowded agenda, and cannot 
afford to spend many resources on a technical and often low-key issue such as trade 
policy. The Belgian Parliaments do not have the capacity to study these issues in much 
detail.  This has been reinforced by Government-Parliament dynamics in foreign affairs 
in general. The Belgian Constitution stipulates that foreign policy is the prerogative of 
the executive branch: the Government negotiates and signs deals, the Parliament 
ratifies. No formal procedures (for example specialized committees) assured that the 
Parliament was regularly updated in some detail about ongoing negotiations. This 
combination of powerlessness and information-asymmetry arguably raised the bar for 
Parliamentary involvement, as the follow-up of trade deals was entirely up to the 
initiative of the Parliament, which then would have to ‘sacrifice’ time and resources 
allocated to other themes over which it had perhaps more immediate control.   
 
Secondly, activity on these issues has also been low because public interest was 
limited and the Parliament is to a certain extent a ‘reactive’ institution. If there is little 
interest in trade from local constituents, the press, civil society or business, the incentive 
for focusing on an issue will be small, and will then largely depend on specific interests 
(and resources) of particular MP’s. Of course, this is in some ways a vicious circle, as lack 
of attention and expertise in turn lower the potential for the Parliament to pick up and 
politicize an issue.  
 
Why the shift in recent years?  
 
A second question we aim to address is why the (Belgian) Parliaments’ passivity has 
disappeared to a considerable extent in recent years, paradoxically after their 
competences had been transferred to the European Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The altered substance of the deals  
 
Part of the explanation is related to the nature and the substance of the new ‘generation’ 
of FTAs. TTIP and CETA are exponents of the movement towards ‘deep’ trade 
agreements, and include provisions that seem to encroach directly on domestic policy 
space  (Young, 2006; De Ville, 2016).   
 
The first of these provisions is investment protection, which became only a supranational 
competence with the Lisbon Treaty as discussed above. Investment protection 
provisions and the dispute settlement procedures to adjudicate investment protection 
disputes (better-known under the acronym ISDS that stands for investment-state 
dispute settlement) through which international investors can sue governments and 
demand compensation against public measures that offend their Treaty-sanctioned 
investor rights are not limited to decisions by the supranational level, but extend to 
every government level. Therefore, every government level also has a reason to fear that 
its policies become the target of a complaint by an investor that might result in sanctions 
as well as in a ‘chilling effect’ in decision-making to avoid the risk of being sanctioned. 
Secondly, TTIP is the first agreement where the self-proclaimed central objective is 
regulatory cooperation, more precisely to remove regulatory differences between the 
parties as well as to establish mechanisms that should render it less probable that the 
parties adopt different regulations in the future (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge 2016). The 
latter should be achieved by adhering to ‘Good Regulatory Practices’ – a number of 
procedural requirements that governments should follow when adopting regulations to 
ensure that they have given sufficient consideration to the trade and investment effects 
and opinions of stakeholders – and bilateral ‘Regulatory Cooperation’ – mandatory 
consultations on regulations by representatives from both parties. What the critics of 
this new dimension of trade agreements fear is that these ostensible innocent provisions 
will lead – analogous to the concerns about investment protection – to ‘paralysis by 
analysis’ and to regulatory chill, i.e. to less decision-making autonomy and lower levels 
of protection than would have been decided by governments absent these provisions.  
 
These deals might thus further limit Parliaments’ power to shape society, possibly 
leading to increased awareness of and in some cases opposition to the deals. In the 
Belgian case there is some evidence of this, i.e. that parliamentary attention was 
triggered in part by the substance of the agreements. For example, in Belgium, 
parliamentary debates have (just as in many other Member States) focused primarily on 
ISDS and regulatory cooperation, as well as the issue of (the fear for liberalisation of) 
public services. Much less attention has been dedicated to the more traditional elements 
of the negotiations such as tariffs. The role of the special nature of the treaties was also 
mentioned in some of our interviews. However, this argument about the content of the 
latest generation of trade agreements is not able to explain the different degree of 
attention that has gone to TTIP on the one hand and CETA or, especially, EU-Japan on 
the other, while their substance is very comparable. Moreover, Parliaments only started 
paying attention to CETA after the deal was already concluded, and TTIP’s mandate was 
agreed upon without much fuss.  
 
The missing link, as we hope to show in the following section, is the wide-scale 
mobilisation against TTIP, and subsequently CETA, by a number of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). 
Mobilization by NGOs and public salience 
 
TTIP and to a lesser extent CETA have led to an unprecedented politicization of the EU’s 
trade agenda. Again, this is in part linked to the substance of these treaties, which raised 
concerns about the impact on domestic policies and policy space. These worries were 
probably also exacerbated by the fact that TTIP, which received the brunt of the 
contestation, was being negotiated with the United States. Not just because this aroused 
some latent anti-Americanism within the public and NGOs, but also because the risk of 
substantial(ly negative) effects (such as those related to ISDS cases, or the possible 
lowering of food standards, see also Eliasson, 2016) was far more likely with such a 
powerful political and economic counterpart11. However, it seems unlikely that these 
elements would have sufficed to bring about the measure of opposition we’ve witnessed 
in the past three years, without the active, successful and enduring mobilization and 
organization by a wide coalition of NGOs and their networks (Gheyle, 2016) 12. Civil 
society has been able to foster a (self-feeding) cycle of growing press coverage, public 
awareness and mobilization, which eventually led to political, including parliamentary, 
attention and contestation.  
 
In Belgium, TTIP has led to the emergence of new trade-policy coalitions. Before TTIP, 
there was a small but significant number of Belgian NGOs (but also those within the 
trade unions working on trade) who often worked and campaigned on trade policy, and 
built up considerable expertise. Their work was mostly related to development and 
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 In earlier agreements, there was no power asymmetry to the disadvantage of the European Union, given that 
the EU mainly conducted trade negotiations with smaller, developing and/or ex-colonial countries. With the US, 
the EU was for the first meeting someone of at least equal power, heightening the fear that EU organizations and 
societies might be harmed. 
12
 Of course, the ‘substantive’ and the ‘mobilization’ explanation are related. The NGOs have captured the 
attention of national Parliaments to some extent by arguing that TTIP (and CETA) threaten the policy-making 
autonomy of national governments. And these elements of the deal were in turn partially responsible for the 
mobilization of civil society.  
 
global justice issues. For example, they mobilized against the BLEU (Belgian-Luxemburg 
Economic Union) Colombia Investment Treaty because of labor issues in Colombia, or 
campaigned against the Economic Partnership Agreements. Outside of this core group 
(which includes amongst others CNCD-11.11.11, Oxfam or Wereldsolidariteit), trade 
policy was a secondary issue for many other organizations. TTIP, however, has drawn 
many new organizations to trade politics, given the possible scope of the agreement. A 
core group of trade unions, North-South organizations and several environmental 
groups has sided with less-traditional groups such as consumer, patient and climate 
organizations, in the self-named 4 May (2015) Coalition (Verenigde Verenigingen, 
2015). This nation-wide coalition has been the main ‘policy’ and lobbying organization 
within Belgium to date, and is coordinated mainly by CNCD-11.11.11. Next to this, a 
more broad-based STOP TTIP coalition (with a very large membership) was established, 
which acts more as the mobilization pillar of the coalition: planning actions or 
demonstrations, writing letters to ministers, press releases, etc13.  
 
These organizations were successful in their attempts to mobilize their membership and 
parts of the general public, but also in generating parliamentary scrutiny. The important 
role of civil society clearly emerges, for example, when analyzing parliamentary texts 
and discussions. In Wallonia’s debates and resolutions, at various times did the deals’ 
opponents hail the work of the NGOs in raising awareness, or mention the greatly 
increased democratic stakes now that such a substantial part of civil society (and the 
general public) was involved. For example, in the 2015 CETA Resolution’s proposal, the 
authors state that « récemment,  les  négociations  entourant  [TTIP, CETA and FTAs in 
general] ont mobilisé largement la société civile  belge  et  européenne,  mais  également  
les  parlements européen et nationaux ».  Civil society’s role was also confirmed 
throughout our interviews. There are frequent contacts between civil society and the 
parties of the left (greens, socialists, to lesser extent Christian democrats), and some of 
the NGOs claim that a substantial amount of parliamentary questions have been fed by 
them. Several MEPs acknowledged that they had been largely unaware of the treaties 
until civil society’s active attempt to raise awareness and foster opposition. At least 
initially, they lacked not only awareness but also expertise, which the NGOs could 
provide.   This claim is bolstered by looking at the 2014 election programs: parties that 
would, from late 2014 on, start opposing these deals fiercely from within the assembly, 
paid very little attention to the treaties during the elections. In fact the PS, cdH, Ecolo 
were all part of the Walloon government when CETA was mandated and concluded, as 
was the sp.a in Flanders and the PS, cdH and the sp.a at the federal level.  
  
It is clear however, that there have been pronounced regional differences in the 
attention for, mobilisation and Parliamentary activity on TTIP and CETA. In almost all of 
the Belgian organisations that have been mobilizing against TTIP, the ‘southern’ wings 
were first to become active and have remained most vocal. This has been translated in 
the political salience of the issue as well. Not only have we seen a much larger number of 
municipalities declare themselves ‘TTIP-free’ in the south of the country, but we have 
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 This group as well is coordinated by CNCD, which shows that the Belgian civil society is a small, but well-
connected group of organizations, who are able to mobilize their partner organizations, and, subsequently, their 
members. The membership of this alliance is evidence of the non-traditional opposition to trade policy. Here too, 
the question of the durability of the alliance is prominent. For some, the actions and cooperation in the last two 
years was a building block for more to come, while others were more pessimistic about sustaining all these 
organizations’ attention for other trade deals. 
also seen much earlier and more intense attention in the Walloon and Federal 
Parliament14.  
 
 Meanwhile, the supporters of the trade agreements were caught off guard and failed to 
develop a coherent block. In Wallonia, for example, the general business federation, 
l’Union Wallonne des Entreprise (UWE), supported both deals, but mustered little in 
terms of actual opposition. Their earliest public remarks about CETA from April 2016, 
around the time of the Parliaments’ resolution, and in an interview they acknowledged 
that they were not putting much effort in turning the tide. Meanwhile, the employers’ 
federation for the SMEs (almost 70% of Walloon employment) came out against the 
deals 15 , as did Wallonia’s main farmers’ federation, le Fédération Wallonne de 
l’Agriculture (FWA) for a variety of reasons related to beef quota, normative and 
regulatory issues, and geographical indicators (FWA, 2016). Again this differed from the 
situation in Flanders, as Flemish business was more united in its approval of the 
negotiations.  Here, representatives of farmers, SMEs and business in general all openly 
supported TTIP and CETA.  
 
Party Politics, Institutions and People 
 
Finally, there are some specific institutional and party-political dynamics at play.  
 
For example, one somewhat idiosyncratic reason that these debates have received this 
kind of attention even in the Flemish parliament has to do with an intra-parliamentary 
development: the rejuvenation of the commission for EU affairs under chairman Rik 
Daems, and the latter’s willingness to make room for in-depth debates on foreign 
economic policy. This allowed the committee members to build the requisite expertise, 
which in turn stimulated discussions. As we saw before, this was to some extent also 
true of the Walloon committee, which decided in 2014 to be more vigilant about trade 
negotiations in particular.  
 
Finally, we must take into account the Belgian institutional and party-political setting. 
Notably, the fact that the PS has been part of the Walloon but not the federal 
government is seen by many as an important factor in this party’s activism on the trade 
front. Magnette’s refusal to sign CETA was perceived as a way to both sabotage the 
federal government (in which the liberal MR is the only Walloon party) while 
simultaneously strengthening its profile vis-à-vis the communist PTB which has been 
searing in the polls. Had the PS (and the sp.a/ecolo/cdH/…) been present in the federal 
government, the party’s stance may have been less confrontational, and this may have 
also dampened the enthusiasm of its MPs. This counterfactual is of course hard to assess. 
To some extent it seems like a plausible narrative, especially at the governmental level. 
                                                        
14
 Again, this cannot be simply explained by the differential potential impact of these agreements on the Walloon 
Region in comparison to the other territories, but is related to mobilization resources, NGO networks and 
differences in responsiveness.   
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 After resisting TTIP from 2015 on yet hesitating with a clear position on CETA, the Union des Classes 
Moyennes (UCM) finally supported the government’s resistance in October 2016. They feared that diminishing 
intra-European trade, lacking geographical indicators, and increased competition from multinationals would 
disadvantage SMEs, while few such enterprises would stand to gain: only a handful of the minority of SMEs that 
export have a significant stake in transatlantic trade, most trade within the EU.  
 
Had the PS been in the federal government, we would probably not have seen the kind of 
cut-throat politics that we now witnessed in October 2016. The conflict would have been 
resolved within the coalition, unless the PS was willing to threaten the cabinet’s survival 
over trade. However, on the other hand it seems plausible that the difference would 
have been one of degrees and not kind. The parliaments could not have turned a blind 
eye to the strong and persistent campaigning by a broad set of societal groups, and 
awareness, expertise and contestation would have increased; but the immediate 
political fallout may have been different.  
Conclusion 
 
In the past years we have seen a somewhat paradoxical evolution in EU trade politics. 
While the Lisbon Treaty was meant to facilitate the adoption of trade agreements by 
clarifying the exclusive supranational competence of the European Union through 
‘updating’ the scope to the new trade agenda, Parliaments below the supranational level 
have become more involved in trade policy than ever before.  
 
We have investigated the shift in involvement across the Belgian parliaments. In the past 
fifteen years, both the Federal, Flemish and Walloon parliament paid little attention to 
EU trade policy. This has changed since 2014, especially in Wallonia but also in the other 
assemblies. Several interacting factors fuelled this increase in Parliamentary 
involvement. First, TTIP and CETA contain provisions that (are perceived to) go 
qualitatively beyond older trade agreements by potentially interfering with 
(sub)national policy choices, namely investment protection provisions and regulatory 
cooperation. Second, TTIP has generated unseen civil society mobilisation, and this has 
led politicians (especially on the left and in the opposition) to join the fray as well. 
Finally, the asymmetry between the Walloon and federal governing coalitions have 
favoured a more activist opposition by Wallonia, while Flanders’ centre-right 
government has remained supportive. 
  
An important question, which also divided our respondents, is how durable the 
politicisation of trade policy and the (consequent) attention and involvement of 
(sub)national MPs will eventually be.  It is conceivable that the mobilisation by civil 
society will wane if and when the TTIP negotiations are eventually concluded 
(successfully or not). With that, attention for EU trade policy in (sub)national 
Parliaments might fade out, even if the substance in other agreements would be similar 
(as is today to some extent the case vis-à-vis the EU-Japan negotiations). On the other 
hand, significant energy and resources have been invested in building expertise and 
networks, by NGOs as well as (sub)national MPs. Such “sunk costs” might lead them to 
continue their involvement in EU trade politics, especially if current efforts would turn 
out to be successful in both influencing the outcome of negotiations and elections. The 
recent ‘CETA episode’ in Belgium has already strengthened the activity by the Walloon 
Parliament. They seem determined to further scrutinize other trade deals currently 
being negotiated, most significantly the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). 
Furthermore, the “Namur declaration” boosted by Minister-President Paul Magnette, 
signed by the likes of Piketty and Dani Rodrik, also shows that the opposition is trying to 
seize the momentum.  
 
Would continue (sub)national Parliamentary involvement in EU trade politics mark the 
death of EU trade policy, as it is sometimes claimed? We tend to disagree. On the one 
hand, the attention and interest of (sub)national MPs has concentrated on a number of 
(sensitive) issues, which might be accommodated in agreements. On the other hand, the 
participation of (sub)national MPs in EU trade politics might be enhanced institutionally 
during the negotiations by collaboration between the European Parliament and the 
national Parliament, as well as outreach by the European Commission. Steps in that 
direction have already been taken by the Belgian Parliaments, the European Parliament 
and the European Commission, and could be reinforced.  
 
Prima facie, the partial re-nationalisation and continued politicization of trade politics 
may benefit the democratic legitimacy of this domain – although it certainly hasn’t made 
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